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I .  INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism to say that electricity is integral to modern life, from the 
basic uses of providing light and heating to the more modern eco-
nomic necessity of the Internet. A widespread or long-term electric 
grid failure would devastate the United States.1 Despite continually 
growing reliance, significant efforts to upgrade the grid and take ad-
vantage of new technologies with the potential to transform grid 
efficiency and reliability have only been underway for about the last 
decade.2 In the United States, there is a coordinated effort between the 
                                                     
 Cynthia Anderson is currently a judicial law clerk and will soon transition 
to an attorney-advisor role in the United States government. She holds a JD, 
magna cum laude, from American University Washington College of Law 
(2016) and a BA in business administration from Oregon State University 
(2009). 
1 Robert Miller, Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure Impacts, in THREATS 
AT OUR THRESHOLD: HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE NEW 
CENTURY 191, 191 (Bert B. Tussing ed., 2006), http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/ 
default/files/071022_ThreatsAtOurThreshold.pdf (describing the collapse of critical 
infrastructure, including the electrical grid, as “catastrophic”). 
2 The main legislation directing resources towards the Smart Grid was enacted in 
December 2007. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 
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federal and state governments and the private sector to implement 
these technologies, creating what is referred to as the Smart Grid.3 
Despite a general agreement between the government, private in-
dustry, and academics to pursue the Smart Grid’s implementation, 
basic arguments about how the technologies should be implemented, 
and whether the U.S. regulatory environment should be restructured, 
as a result, are still largely unresolved.4 Under the current framework, 
each state retains regulatory authority over most aspects of electricity 
generation and all aspects of distribution, leaving a fairly limited role 
for the federal government.5 Inherent in the design of the Smart Grid, 
however, is an increased interconnectedness that makes differing reg-
ulatory standards all the more likely to have a significant impact on 
broader grid reliability and interstate commerce.6 This potential for 
grid-wide impact is nowhere more clear-cut than in relation to 
cybersecurity standards.7 
                                                     
(2007). The organization at “the forefront of research into the feasibility of the smart 
grid on a large scale” was established in 2008. EarthTalk, How Upgrading the Power Grid 
Will Save Energy and Money, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 6, 2009), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/upgrading-power-grid/# (discussing the 
Future Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management Systems Center and its 
work with “universities, industry and national laboratories” to develop smart 
technologies). 
3 See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2013) (indicating that both federal and state governments have begun to build 
“[c]omprehensive policy frameworks”). 
4 See discussion infra Part III (explaining competing views over regulatory structure of 
the Smart Grid). 
5 See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing traditional jurisdictional lines related to 
electricity regulation). 
6 See discussion infra Section II.C.ii.a (detailing concerns about the potential impact of 
the Smart Grid structure on the security of the electric grid). 
7 As this article went to press, information was released by the United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (“US-CERT”) that underscored the potential for a 
cybersecurity breach of the U.S. electric grid, and the need to ensure even the most 
remote portions of the grid are made secure. US-CERT revealed in an Alert released 
March 15, 2018, that the Russian Government had “targeted small commercial facilities’ 
networks where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing, and gained remote 
access into energy sector networks. See Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting 
Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors, TA18-074A (Mar. 15, 2018), 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A. Although the information was 
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State governments and many local utilities argue that implement-
ing the Smart Grid should not have any effect on the jurisdictional 
balance between the states and the federal government.8 While this is 
largely accepted in relation to rate-setting and utility-siting, many 
academics argue that federal jurisdiction should be expanded when 
setting cybersecurity standards to protect against potential 
vulnerabilities caused by differing standards.9 
 
I I .  BACKGROUND 
A. Overview of the Electrical Grid 
Structure 
In the United States, the electrical grid is separated into two regional 
interconnections and three intrastate grids.10 The Eastern Interconnec-
tion is comprised of all of the states east of the Rockies, and portions 
of Canada.11 The Western Interconnection is comprised of all of the 
contiguous states west of the Rockies, and portions of Canada and 
                                                     
recently publicized, the Russian government has been targeting U.S. critical 
infrastructure since at least March 2016. Id. 
8 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 51 (saying that “[s]tates are virtually unwilling to cede any 
authority to [the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]” when it comes to regulating 
the Smart Grid). 
9 See discussion infra Section II.B (citing academic articles arguing that federal regulation 
is necessary). 
10 See Learn More About Interconnections, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY 
RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-
coordination-and-implementation/transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Learn More] (describing the Eastern and Western 
Interconnections and recognizing Alaska and most of Texas as having discrete grids); 
William Pentland, What is at Stake for Hawaii in NextEra Energy – HECO Merger, FORBES 
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2015/01/30/what-is-at-
stake-for-hawaii-in-nextera-energy-heco-merger/ (recognizing that Hawaii, Alaska, 
and Texas are run separate from the regional grids due, in the case of the former two, 
to physical isolation). 
11 See Learn More, supra note 9 (recognizing that most of Texas is excluded from the 
Eastern Interconnection). 
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Mexico.12 Because the regional interconnections involve the interstate 
transmission of electricity, federal jurisdiction to regulate is 
implicated in certain parts of the process, as described below.13 
There are three distinct components to the electrical grid for regu-
latory purposes—generation, transmission, and distribution.14 
Electricity generation occurs at individual, intrastate plants utilizing a 
variety of methods, including coal-burning, nuclear reaction, and 
solar conversion.15 Generated electricity is routed through high-
power, intrastate voltage lines for transmission to meet usage needs 
across the entire interconnection.16 While bulk electricity sales do 
occur directly among providers along the high-voltage transmission 
lines, final distribution to end consumers such as businesses and indi-
vidual homes is facilitated by local utility companies.17 Despite the 
integrated ability to transmit power generated in one state to an end 
user in another, providers have had limited visibility into issues along 
the grid.18 Representative of this limited visibility is the fact that 
“utilit[ies] often only know[] where an outage is located when [they] 
receive[] a customer's phone call.”19 
                                                     
12 Id. Note, although the Eastern and Western Interconnections both extend beyond the 
boundaries of the United States, that does not change anything discussed below 
regarding jurisdictional authority. 
13 See discussion infra Section I.B (describing the existing federal and state jurisdictional 
boundaries). Note that because their grids are contained wholly within the borders of 
one state, Hawaii, Alaska, and the majority of Texas are not subject to federal 
jurisdiction and are thus outside of the scope of this paper. See Pentland, supra note 9. 
14 See, e.g., New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2002) [hereinafter 
New York v. FERC] (recognizing generation, transmission, and distribution as 
fundamental aspects of providing electricity and that Congress drew jurisdictional lines 
along those three categories in the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) of 1935). 
15 Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role of a National Network Coordinator, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1993, 2001 (2014). 
16 See id. (explaining that transmission networks have been increasingly interconnected 
to increase grid reliability and defray costs of expensive new power plants through co-
ownership). 
17 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 10–11 (recognizing that transmission lines are 
integral to the bulk power market but that sales to retail customers occur through state-
regulated utility companies). 
18 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 8 (noting a general failure to use sensors and other 
technology for monitoring). 
19 Id. 
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B. Federal and State Jurisdictional Lines 
in Electricity Regulation 
Federal jurisdiction over the electrical grid is derived from Congress’s 
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce.20 Regulatory 
authority is, therefore, divided between the state and federal govern-
ments based on whether the function of an action or regulated entity 
is intrastate or interstate in nature. Jurisdictional boundaries have 
essentially followed those established by Congress under the Federal 
Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”).21 
The FPA provides for federal jurisdiction over the transmission 
and wholesale sale of electric energy in interstate commerce.22 It 
specifically exempts from federal jurisdiction any facilities used in 
electricity generation, local distribution, and intrastate transmission.23 
Thus, of the three components of the electrical grid, only transactions 
associated with high-voltage interstate transmission lines fall under 
the  general jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”). 
Although FERC only has general authority to regulate interstate 
transmission and wholesale sales, it does have limited jurisdiction 
over electricity generation facilities. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
amended the FPA to extend federal jurisdiction over “generation facil-
ities needed to maintain transmission system reliability” for purposes 
of mandatory grid reliability standards affecting interstate transmis-
sion and the bulk-power system.24 Accordingly, the federal govern-
ment has some form of regulatory authority over two of the three 
components of the electrical grid. 
                                                     
20 See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining that the Federal Power Act of 
1935 was enacted to provide for federal regulation over aspects of the electrical grid 
that states could not regulate under the Commerce Clause). 
21 See Christopher Bosch, Note, Securing the Smart Grid: Protecting National Security and 
Privacy Through Mandatory, Enforceable Interoperability Standards, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1349, 1398 (2014) (noting that the FPA provided the original statutory basis for federal 
regulation of the electric grid, though the scope of allowed regulation has grown over 
time due to increased interconnectedness of the grid). 
22 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2014). 
23 Id. § 824(b)(1). 
24 Id. § 824o(a)(1)(B); see also id. at § 824o(b) (defining commission jurisdiction). 
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Though there is no explicit statutory authority for federal regula-
tion of distribution-level public utilities, some voluntary actions by 
the utilities can bring them under FERC jurisdiction for rate-setting 
purposes. In New York v. FERC,25 the Supreme Court reviewed FERC 
Order No. 888, which, inter alia, required application of a single tariff 
for all utilities purchasing transmission services whenever retail utili-
ties voluntarily unbundled generation and transmission pricing.26 
New York argued that FERC had exceeded the boundaries of its juris-
diction in attempting to regulate unbundled retail transmission prices 
because all retail transactions were “properly the subject of state 
regulation.”27 The Supreme Court rejected New York’s argument, 
however, and concluded that FERC did have jurisdiction to regulate 
the unbundled retail transmission of electricity because it had juris-
diction over any transmission in interstate commerce and “the nature 
of the national grid” results in all electricity transmission being 
aggregated on the same transmission lines.28 
C. The Smart Grid 
The Smart Grid is a coordinated effort across the electricity industry 
to create “robust communication paths between end-use consumers . 
. . and upstream to the utilities, or other energy service providers.”29 
There are five categories of Smart Grid systems being implemented30: 
                                                     
25 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1. 
26 Id. at 11. 
27 Id. at 16. 
28 Id. at 17. See id. at 7, 17, 20 (reviewing the structure of the electrical grid and concluding 
that transmission was inherently interstate in nature and therefore properly subject to 
federal regulation, regardless of whether the end purchaser was wholesale or retail). 
29 Ray Gifford & Eric Gunning, Telecommunications & Electronic Media: The Opportunity 
and Peril of Smart Grid, 11 ENGAGE 128 (2010). 
30 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-117, ELECTRICITY GRID 
MODERNIZATION: PROGRESS BEING MADE ON CYBERSECURITY GUIDELINES, BUT KEY 
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO BE ADDRESSED 7 tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter “GAO Report”] 
(explaining the Smart Grid system categories described by the National Energy 
Technology Laboratory (“NETL”)). 
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(1) Integrated communications;31 (2) advanced components;32 (3) 
advanced control methods;33 (4) sensing and measurement;34 and (5) 
improved interfaces and decision support.35 The U.S. Department of 
Energy lists the following anticipated benefits of the Smart Grid 
technologies include: 
• More efficient transmission of electricity 
• Quicker restoration of electricity after power disturbances  
• Reduced operations and management costs for utilities, and 
ultimately lower power costs for consumers 
• Reduced peak demand, which will also help lower electricity 
rates  
• Increased integration of large-scale renewable energy systems 
• Better integration of customer-owner power generation systems, 
including renewable energy systems  
• Improved security36 
 
 
                                                     
31 Integrated communication systems are “[h]igh-speed, fully integrated, two-way 
communications technologies” that allow for “real-time information and power 
exchange.” Id. These technologies are implemented along the distribution channels or 
in consumer homes. Id. 
32 Advanced component systems utilize the latest technologies to “produce higher 
power densities, greater reliability and power quality . . . and improved real-time 
diagnostics.” Id. Examples include enhanced use of storage devices, “smart appliances” 
in consumer homes and businesses, and local “microgrids” that can operate 
independently from the larger grid when necessary. Id. 
33 Advanced control methods systems “monitor power system components” to 
“improve utilization of generation and transmission assets” by, for instance, using 
sensors along substation and distribution facilities to automatically identify system 
failures. Id. at 8. 
34 Sensing and measurement systems provide information about equipment 
functionality and consumer demand to utility companies and inform consumers about 
current prices and demand. Id. This is accomplished through use of “smart meters,” 
sensors, “[c]onsumer portals,” and “[d]ynamic line-rating devices.” Id. 
35 Improved interface and decision support systems utilize software to analyze system 
data and enable utility employees to make “more accurate and timely” decisions. Id. 
36 OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, What 
is the Smart Grid?, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/the_smart_grid/smart 
_grid.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2018). 
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i. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
While efforts were initiated by private industry, both federal and state 
legislators have taken steps to promote the initiative.37 The primary 
federal statute regulating Smart Grid progress is the Energy Inde-
pendence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”).38 EISA lays out ten goals 
for the Smart Grid that, together, are intended to “maintain a reliable 
and secure electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand 
growth . . . .”39 Additionally, it provides direction for the creation of a 
uniform framework of interoperability standards that will ensure all 
components of the Smart Grid can interact effectively and securely.40 
In doing so, it provides for some additional federal jurisdiction over 
the electricity industry.41 
EISA assigns the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) primary responsibility for coordinating the development of 
a framework of interoperability standards for the Smart Grid.42 It re-
quires NIST to solicit input from other federal committees, including 
the Smart Grid Task Force and the Smart Grid Advisory Committee,43 
as well as state agencies and private industry.44 The NIST standards 
                                                     
37 See GAO Report, supra note 29, at 4 (acknowledging that electricity industry made 
initial steps towards updating the grid to take advantage of new technologies); Eisen, 
supra note 3, at 6 (indicating that both federal and state governments have begun to 
build “[c]omprehensive policy frameworks”). 
38 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that Congress enacted EISA to prescribe the 
Smart Grid standards-setting process). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2014). EISA’s ten listed goals for the Smart Grid system inform the 
work conducted by the NETL and the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) as described supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a)–(b) (2012). 
41 See discussion infra Section II.C.i (describing EISA-based federal jurisdiction). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a). 
43 Id. § 17383(a)(1). The Smart Grid Task Force and Smart Grid Advisory Committee 
were established under EISA to act in an advisory capacity to relevant federal agency 
heads by being involved in federal, state, and private Smart Grid initiatives. See Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 § 1303 (2007). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 17385(a)(1)–(2). 
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are required to be “flexible, uniform and technology neutral.”45 How-
ever, state and industry adoption of the NIST standards is strictly 
voluntary.46 
Under EISA, FERC is provided with jurisdiction to adopt NIST 
interoperability standards as mandatory through rulemaking pro-
ceedings where there is “sufficient consensus” regarding the stand-
ard, and it is “necessary to insure smart-grid functionality and 
interoperability in interstate transmission of electric power, and 
regional and wholesale electricity markets.”47 FERC has interpreted 
the language to mean that it has authorization to conduct rulemaking 
proceedings affecting distribution-level facilities, if necessary.48 How-
ever, it is generally accepted that because EISA does not provide FERC 
with any additional enforcement authority, the standards will only be 
mandatory where they fall within FERC’s other grants of 
jurisdictional authority under the FPA, as amended.49 
ii. Cybersecurity Concerns 
a. Identified Potential Vulnerabilities 
In a 2011 report, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) iden-
tified a number of potential vulnerabilities in the Smart Grid system.50 
The vulnerabilities included a larger number of potential entry points 
into the electrical grid by hackers as a result of increased integration 
                                                     
45 Id. § 17385(b). 
46 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1380–81 (explaining that NIST standards can only become 
mandatory if adopted through a FERC rulemaking proceeding in compliance with EISA 
requirements). 
47 42 U.S.C. § 17385(d). 
48 See GAO Report, supra note 29, at 13 n.12. 
49 Compare GAO Report, supra note 29, at 18–19 (explaining that FERC would have the 
ability to enforce standards, in conjunction with the North American Electric 
Corporation, under its grid-reliability authorities and through incentive-based 
programs), with Eisen, supra note 3, at 37 (noting that FERC enforcement power is 
limited to “its existing FPA authorities to regulate interstate transmission of 
electricity”). 
50 These vulnerabilities are reflected in the introductory “What GAO Found” section of 
the GAO Report. See GAO Report, supra note 29. 
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of grid components and newly implemented systems; unknown vul-
nerabilities inherent with new system and network technologies; the 
ability for hackers to affect a larger area of the grid at one time through 
interconnecting systems; and increased incentives to hack the system 
for monetary gain because of the potentially large amount of customer 
information stored within the system.51 It is generally acknowledged 
that a single attack has the potential to cause region-wide electrical 
grid failures that could last for days at a time.52 Such an occurrence 
could have an almost unimaginable economic and human impact, 
especially if a cyber-attack were coordinated with a physical terrorist 
attack.53 As one commentator notes, the negative consequences of a 
widespread power outage are exacerbated by the interdependent na-
ture of the nation’s critical infrastructure systems, such as water and 
transportation, with the electrical grid.54 
b. Attacks That Have Already Occurred 
The GAO vaguely references a variety of cybersecurity issues that 
have already occurred or been proven to be a threat, in the United 
States and abroad.55 Cybersecurity experts have shown that vulnera-
bilities in smart meters have the potential to allow a hacker to disrupt 
the electricity grid,56 and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) has 
                                                     
51 Id. at 9 (listing categories of risk involving physical infrastructure). 
52 E.g., Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the Electricity Sector: The First Step to 
Protecting our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 326–
27 (2013) (discussing the means by which an attack may have wide reaching regional 
consequences). 
53 Cf. Miller, supra note 1 (describing the collapse of critical infrastructure, including the 
electrical grid, as “catastrophic”). 
54 See Michael McElfresh, Can the Smart Grid Survive a Cyberattack?, ENERGY POST (June 
29, 2015), http://www.energypost.eu/can-smart-grid-survive-cyberattack/ (quoting a 
report that called the electrical grid an obvious target for those seeking to do physical, 
economic and psychological harm to the nation). 
55 See GAO Report, supra note 29. The summary “What GAO Found” section 
acknowledges that the report was not able to adequately address the risk of attacks, 
despite the GAO’s intention to do so. 
56 See Eduard Kovacs, Smart Meters Pose Security Risks to Consumers, Utilities: Researcher, 
SECURITY WEEK (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.securityweek.com/smart-meters-pose-
security-risks-consumers-utilities-researcher (explaining that hackers could hijack 
network traffic-connecting smart appliances and the grid and take control of devices). 
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already reported regional overseas power disruption as a result of 
“malicious activities against IT systems[.]”57 The cited materials refer-
encing the CIA-acknowledged attacks are no longer accessible, but 
there are still media reports available online. Though the media 
reports do not include specifics, one attack apparently resulted in a 
multi-city power failure, while others resulted in extortion demands.58 
The Stuxnet computer worm is also cited as an example of a signifi-
cant cybersecurity concern for the U.S. electrical grid, though that 
attack was not carried out against an electrical grid.59 
 
I I I .  ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
EXTENDING FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 
The arguments are fairly predictable for why or why not to extend 
federal jurisdiction over the electrical grid for cybersecurity standard-
setting purposes. State regulators want to maintain the existing juris-
dictional boundaries, which would keep federal involvement limited 
to aspects involving interstate transmission and wholesale sales.60 
Many academics argue, however, that it is necessary for federal juris-
diction to extend over the entire electrical grid for cybersecurity 
standard-setting purposes, to ensure consistency and compliance.61 
Each of these arguments contains additional nuance, explored further 
below. 
                                                     
Researchers have said that the security vulnerabilities have persisted, despite initial 
studies showing their existence in 2010. Id. 
57 See GAO Report, supra note 29, at 10. 
58 Tom Espiner, CIA: Cyberattack Caused Multiple-City Blackout, CNET NEWS (Jan. 22, 
2008), https://www.cnet.com/news/cia-cyberattack-caused-multiple-city-blackout/. 
59 See McElfresh, supra note 53 (explaining how the systems used to operate the Smart 
Grid are substantially similar to those that were compromised by the Stuxnet computer 
worm, which shut down Iranian centrifuges used for uranium enrichment); Doug 
Drinkwater, Stuxnet-style Attack on US Smart Grid Could Cost Government $1 Trillion, SC 
MAGAZINE (July 13, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/stuxnet-style-attack-on-us-
smart-grid-could-cost-government-1-trillion/article/426108/ (discussing a report that 
detailed why the U.S. electrical grid could be vulnerable to a Stuxnet-style attack). 
60 E.g., Gifford & Gunning, supra note 28, at 130. 
61 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1391–94 (explaining that voluntary or limited standards 
are insufficient because of the high stakes involved if a failure does occur). 
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A. Arguments for Maintaining Existing 
Jurisdictional Boundaries 
There are essentially two categories of arguments for maintaining 
existing jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal govern-
ments for purposes of Smart Grid cybersecurity regulation: first, that 
the federal government only has enforcement authority over inter-
state transmission, and any further standards could only be enforced 
by influencing the states; and second, that there are practical concerns 
with mandating standards at a federal level. 
It is noted that, even if FERC could mandate standards for all 
portions of the grid and all participants, “it [is] not clear how it would 
enforce a mandate.”62 Some argue that FERC “can only mandate 
standards for interstate transmission” and that it has no “authority 
over generation, middle-mile and last-mile distribution, or in-home 
energy management.”63 This traditional breakdown should continue 
to be seen in the jurisdictional boundaries for physical Smart Grid in-
vestments.64 Thus, an attempt by the federal government to change its 
jurisdiction over Smart Grid cybersecurity could be seen by states as 
“an attempt to usurp some of the state powers with respect to the pru-
dence of grid investments, interoperability mandates, and grid 
management.”65 Rather, it is necessary for federal agencies to convince 
states to enact the standards proposed by NIST in order to avoid legal 
challenges to federal jurisdictional authority.66 
There are numerous practical concerns about a change in jurisdic-
tional boundaries relating to cybersecurity of the Smart Grid. 
Specifically, the concerns relate to the potential negative effects of 
                                                     
62 Eisen, supra note 3, at 51. 
63 Gifford & Gunning, supra note 28, at 129. 
64 See id. at 130 (discussing the juxtaposition between federal jurisdiction asserted over 
all cybersecurity of the smart grid with the retained traditional jurisdictional 
boundaries for physical infrastructure investment approvals). 
65 Id. 
66 See Resolution, Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Commissioners, Resolution Regarding Smart 
Grid (July 22, 2009), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?id=53985C5D-2354-D714-51F0-
F9226449 C37D (emphasizing the need for the federal government to partner with the 
state regulatory authorities in creating policies and standards for the Smart Grid and 
emphasizing jurisdictional lines for FERC and the state governments). 
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mandatory regulation.67 For instance, private-sector commentators 
noted that it prefers voluntary standards because they are more flexi-
ble and less likely to be set arbitrarily or to remain in place despite 
becoming obsolete.68 State governments and electricity providers 
expressed concern that any mandatory rules, even if limited to areas 
of traditional jurisdiction, would “gain traction and work their way 
down to the local level.”69 Thus, in effect, any federal rules would be-
come the standard across all levels and undermine state authority to 
regulate.70 
B.  Arguments for Extending Federal Jurisdiction to 
Include Cybersecurity of all Aspects of the Smart 
Grid 
Even proponents of extending FERC’s jurisdiction do not assert that 
its enforcement authority was affected by EISA.71 Rather, the argu-
ments rest on the fact that FERC and the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) can, in fact, promulgate rules under 
those acts—enforcement concerns aside—and that mandatory rules 
are simply necessary.72 One reason why mandatory standards across 
the entire grid are necessary is that a grid failure would have such 
devastating consequences.73 For instance, the aggregate impact of 
                                                     
67 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 51 (identifying mandatory regulations as one of the greatest 
concerns for Smart Grid commentators). 
68 See id. at 51–52. (expressing concerns about mandatory FERC requirements and 
potential monopolization of the energy sector). 
69 Id. at 51. 
70 Cf. ROGER LEVY ET AL., SMART GRID STANDARDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE 
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS; BACKGROUND AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 13 
(Nov. 2010), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/naruc-nist111010.pdf (noting the 
potential for federal agency adoption to create jurisdictional issues while asserting that 
adoption of mandatory standards by some states could impact operations in other states 
in the interconnection). 
71 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1392–93 (noting that EISA was unclear about how FERC 
would enforce the standards it allowed FERC to promulgate via rulemaking, but that 
FERC did not interpret its enforcement authorities to have been modified by the 
statute). 
72 See id. at 1393 (listing industry concerns resulting from a lacking standard). 
73 See id. at 1394 (emphasizing electricity’s significant role in daily lives); see also supra 
notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
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“smart grid home device[s]” on the bulk power grid could result in 
wide-spread reliability or security issues across an interconnection.74 
In addition, proponents argue that, rather than being negative for the 
industry by risking stagnant standards, a uniform approach would 
benefit stakeholders by providing certainty that investments into 
security and infrastructure will comply with requirements and thus 
industry stakeholders will not “risk losing their entire investment if 
future laws invalidate their approach.”75 
 
IV .  CONCLUSION 
Cybersecurity of the Smart Grid presents a unique problem regarding 
decades-old and long-settled jurisdictional boundaries in the area of 
electricity regulation. Because vulnerabilities at a single point on the 
Smart Grid could result in power failure on an interstate or regional 
scale, the concept of local distribution of power does not apply as 
directly as it would in traditional transactions. Though Congress has 
passed a law that does provide FERC with authority to promulgate 
rules-setting standards for cybersecurity of the Smart Grid, there re-
mains controversy over whether, and to what extent, federal 
jurisdiction has been or should be broadened. 
Industry commentators argue that mandatory rules set by the fed-
eral government will often be behind the curve on what is technolog-
ically possible and will be left in place long after becoming obsolete. 
Thus, the Smart Grid would inherently have unnecessary 
vulnerabilities that would be addressed by using the most up-to-date 
knowledge and technologies. On the other hand, proponents of ex-
panding federal jurisdiction point out that whenever standards are 
not mandatory, some actors will always fail to implement necessary 
                                                     
74 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Comment of the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation in Response to the Commission’s March 19, 2009 
Proposed Smart Grid Policy Statement 11 (May 11, 2009), 
http://www.nerc.com/files/NERCSmartGridPolicy StatementComments.pdf. 
75 See Bosch, supra note 20, at 1396–97 (quoting BOB LOCKHART & BOB GOHN, PIKE 
RESEARCH, UTILITY CYBER SECURITY: SEVEN KEY SMART GRID SECURITY TRENDS TO 
WATCH IN 2012 AND BEYOND 5 (2011)) (describing how uncertainty about standards at 
early stages is likely preventing investment and innovation). 
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safeguards. Because of the interconnected nature of the Smart Grid, 
any single vulnerability would have far-reaching consequences. Thus, 
a uniform approach would benefit stakeholders by providing clear 
guidance that supports investment in costly infrastructure and 
technology upgrades. 
